Whilst looking at the current debate about the question of whether it is acceptable to make decisions about funding Ukraine’s War of Independence weeks before an election, one might think that this is more like an excuse – rather than a meaningful argument. A decision made during a legislative period will always influence the disposition of a future government down the road. Following Scholz’s argument would lead to never being able to make a decision, which is not based on the approval of all political factions. It is much more likely that this (in)action is directed towards those who see supporting Ukraine critically. Following this thought, what we see is – once again – nothing more than the attempt to fish for votes. The problem is that it is like fishing in polluted waters.
Decades of passivity
German foreign policy in the last 20 years has been characterized by inactivity. Not in the sense of isolationism – the German military was of course involved in several military actions, for example in Afghanistan and Mali, but arguably not because of any intrinsic reasons, but rather due to outside pressure from NATO, the US, and now France. This is not to say Germany did not claim to have certain ambitions. The mission in Afghanistan was always closely connected with the idea of humanitarian aid and state-building. The public reason for German military presence both with the UNAMA and MINUSMA missions has always something to do with either the responsibility to protect or state building and the strengthening of democratic systems. Whilst this is not in itself a bad ambition, I argue that it is disingenuous, because of the following reasons:
German involvement in Afghanistan is the direct consequence of both 9/11 and the fact that German leadership refused to participate in the US intervention in Iraq. Although we do want it to be otherwise, even institutions like NATO and the UN are influenced by power and by extension, powerful states. Since WW2, German security has been highly dependent on the US. This is something we have to keep in mind. On the other hand, the US is not dependent on allies to follow its ambitions. This creates a situation, where allied participation in US-led missions becomes a symbol. If we look at this with a realist mindset, it becomes clear that the smaller NATO members have to appease both US leadership and public opinion, because the alternative would entail massive risks to European national security. In this sense, Germany had to get involved in ‘The War against Terror’, because we needed to. This leads to a certain kind of operational planning that repeats itself time and time again: Unclear mission objectives.
The kind of ‘passivity’ I am referring to does not mean inactivity. What it does mean is that when we act, we act in a way which is not determined by strategy, national interests or even moral ambition, but by the necessity of playing our part to appease our allies and – most importantly – the US.
Why this is a problem
Whilst I do not advocate for a new era of ‘Global German ambition’, being the sidekick of a superpower entails some obvious issues. Before we come to questions of national sovereignty, I want to discuss some, more particular consequences. Looking back at our involvement in Afghanistan, the mission objective started to shift from fighting back against Al-Qaeda and denying this region for further ‘terrorist activity’ to a combination of Statebuilding and democratization of the nonexistent Afghan state. Although it is not possible to state a concrete date, at some point in the early 21. century, the threat of global terror was eliminated and – ironically – a new mission objective was established that would fail at the end. The idea is that it would be possible to build a stable, liberal democracy in a country that barely resembles a coherent state – not to talk about any kind of national unity – in less than two decades.
This ambition was set up for failure. This has multiple reasons. First of all, a military intervention is the wrong tool for state-building. Military force can be used to fight an enemy or protect a population against one. In recent history, only two military interventions lead to the creation of a liberal democracy: The invasion of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The preconditions in both nations were vastly different than in Afghanistan. And, the resources that were invested in these theaters were huge in comparison. Whilst the US alone lost up to 400’000 soldiers in both theaters to fight against Axis states and allies, the about 50 German deaths in about 20 years of combat in Afghanistan almost ended the mission altogether. Stating a political goal without actually investing the resources to achieve them, is what characterizes German foreign policy of the last 20 years.
It’s not a bug, it’s a feature
There are multiple reasons for this. One of the most important factors is that German leadership is not willing to give an honest explanation of both the reasons and the objectives of military intervention overseas if they do not follow a clear, morally unambiguous reason like R2P. Whilst such an approach, recently formalized by German Foreign Minister Bearbock as “Wertegeleitete Aussenpolitik” or value-driven foreign policy, is not in itself questionable, it is both unrealistic and not an accurate description of German foreign policy. This leads to a dangerous situation: Politicians and leadership produce a public expectation that can never be met. If you say that your policy decisions are made in the light of moral ambition and then have to backtrack and buy more oil from states like Saudi Arabia, you make yourself untrustworthy.
In my opinion, this realization has slowly trickled in. And it is one of the reasons that we never hear any clear goal regarding our policy and support of Ukraine. We cannot say that we support Ukraine’s claim to full territorial integrity because we know that the will to give support to this extent simply does not exist. The issue is, that we think, that public opinion won’t accept realistic geopolitical ambitions and objectives as an explanation. But strategic ambiguity aside, more honesty would certainly help. What are our goals? And: When are these goals achieved? How does our exit strategy look? Questions like these have to be answered first, before sending infantry to do state-building.
The upcoming challenges will be demanding, but hiding them in a layer of clouds and mist will not help.
In my opinion, one of the main reasons behind the current populist uprising is false or misleading communication. I am convinced that many decisions can be explained in a way, which makes the underlying reasoning understandable. And yes, this means openly discussing German and European political objectives. Trying to gain trust from those who do not share a similar view on these issues by not telling them what you want will not work.