Recently, the Danish Defence Intelligence Services (DDIS) published their Intelligence Outlook 2024 – a paper discussing the possible threats and challenges for the coming years. Whilst most information is not novel in itself, I still find the perspective of the relatively small Nordic state valuable.
My aim here is to reproduce the most crucial aspects of this paper – what does the Kingdom of Denmark see as the main points of concern and (maybe even more interesting) what is not mentioned, with a focus on Denmark’s perspective and potential implications for its western partners.
Russia
The paper’s focus is clearly on both China and Russia as the two biggest concerns to Danish interests. The reason for this lies in the strengthened cooperation between these two actors which allows them to further their interests in a way that was not seen previously. We will engage with China later in more detail, but it is important to recognize that these two threats are inherently connected and should not be seen as separate.
The DDIS proposes that Russia has the “ambition to force a change in the European security order”. The means to this end have so far been relatively weak in the sense that “strong anti-Western” rhetoric was the weapon of choice. Due to the lack of results, we will likely see an increase in sabotage and hybrid warfare. The intelligence outlook also stresses that Russian aggression will be both more likely and successful if the Kremlin can attack individual NATO countries in a situation, where the organization “no longer presents a united front”. Although Ukraine’s future is currently very unclear, the post-Ukraine war disposition will inform the European security situation over the next decades. The changed global order and the climate of threat and aggression came to stay and will influence the strategic situation in Europe.
Russia has the ambition to be a powerful player in a new world order. This includes weakening the US and disintegrating Western unity. The overall goal is probably similar to changing the rules in the current rules-based world order so that “great powers and major regional powers can pursue their own interests with no regard for the interests of the US and other western countries, and (…) the ability and willingness of great powers to use military force ultimately defines the rules of the game in international relations.” The fact that China shares this goal gives Russia room for maneuvering and probing the waters. It is a plausible assumption that Russia wants to regain control over its former sphere of influence.
Russia has several options to challenge NATO members. These include threatening actions against both military and civilian aviation and shipping i.e. close flybys and similar, deliberate violation of NATO territorial borders, military exercises close to the borders of member states, jamming of electronic communication and GPS signals, and other electronic warfare measures. Russia’s will to use military force to further its goals is increasing – even if most of its conventional force is occupied in Ukraine. Both Russia’s agenda and its actions are often rational but based on misconceptions. It is important to understand this and to appreciate that decisions made by Russian officials are often well thought out and have a meaningful impact. On the other hand – Putin most likely has a small circle of advisors who share his anti-Western (and sometimes conspiratorial) views, which creates an echo chamber and fosters bad decisions as seen in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, Russia faced severe economic deterioration. As a regime change – or a change in objective – is very unlikely, Western sanctions will continue to affect Russia for the time being. The demographic problems, which the war in Ukraine only accelerated, will show their effect in the near future. It is on the other hand necessary to recognize that a failing Russian state will most likely have undesirable effects on European security as well.
Hybrid Warfare
The main conclusion that the Intelligence Outlook draws is, that “Russia is preparing sabotage against crucial subsea infrastructure in the event of war”. And whilst listening to Putin, you get the impression that we already are. This is one aspect that, in my mind, does not get enough attention and is sometimes even downplayed by certain politicians: If a hostile actor (like Russia) launches a full-scale war against any European country, they will start with attacks on critical infrastructure and other civilian infrastructure that the defending actor needs. Recognizing that this is Russia’s ambition is in my eyes crucial. Russia does not play by the rules, And it is an interesting question if we can afford to stay lawful citizens for much longer.
Underwater infrastructure is extremely volatile. But it is only one possible mode of hybrid warfare. Others include interruption of energy supply, weaponizing of migration, campaigns for influence, cyber warfare, intelligence, sabotage, and – besides others – aggressive threats. Especially the growing Russian influence in nationalistic and far-right political groups in Europe should be seen as a concern and can be categorized as a means of hybrid war.
The Arctic
Despite being a major concern for almost all big global actors, the Arctic is not really a subject of discourse in the German public. The Kingdom of Denmark can share a very different view on that matter. With Greenland and the Føroyar (Faroe) Islands, Denmark has a direct interest in the Arctic region.
The deteriorating relations between Russia, China, and the West leads to both sides expanding their military capabilities in the Arctic. For Russia, the north Atlantic is vital for its nuclear deterrence: for nuclear submarines stationed on the Kola peninsula, the only way to the US east coast is through the GIUK – gap, the open sea between Greenland, Island, and Ireland. From Russia’s point of view, keeping this passage open is a necessity to ensure MAD.
On the other hand, the Arctic holds a lot of value for its strategic position. Russian forces are thinly stretched at the moment, but the Kremlin cannot afford to lose military superiority in this region to the West. This also increases their “willingness to take risks”, as hybrid actions are cheaper and do not necessitate a massive military presence. “If Russia eventually is able to devote more resources (…) [to] the Arctic, it will likely continue and possibly expand its aggressive stance (…).” A stronger Russia will be less inclined to engage in any negotiations and will defend its interests with other means. At the moment, Arctic cooperation serves Russia well, which is why they are still a member of the Arctic Council. This is however dependent on how much it serves Russian interests.
Another ambitious player in the Arctic is China. Whilst not an Arctic state itself, China is continuing to put pressure on Russia to “(…) gradually give China increased access to the Russian Arctic.” China will use the Arctic to strengthen its global position. It has increasing ambitions to build the capability for military operation over the coming decade. China’s goals are especially to secure maritime access and the Arctic’s natural resources: “Arctic sea routes can shorten transport time for goods to and from Europe [by] approximately 14 days (…).”, which would mean a massive economic gain for China.
China’s strategy to diversify its energy imports will also play a role in the medium future.
The Arctic will become an area of tension in the coming years and decades. Preparing for it now could ensure better access to trade and resources, but it could also protect Europe from a growing Russian and Chinese influence in the high north.
China
China is first and foremost looking out for its own interests. Beijing is currently taking advantage of the situation that Russia maneuvered itself in, whilst on the other hand trying to maintain Western partners for economic and scientific cooperation. At the moment, they still need Western partners. But they are preparing for a potential conflict with the West.
China used its condition as a new market to influence Western companies, gain technology and information, and bind the West in an economic way. This is however not a goal in itself. The overall ambition of the PRC is to become a dominating world actor, and it uses Russia and other countries to that end. Currently, “China is trying to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe (…) [and] between European countries, to prevent Europe from presenting a united front.” I will discuss a potential war with Taiwan another time, but it is clear that the CCP will use whatever is necessary to achieve its overall goals.
A major war with Taiwan would put the Kingdom of Denmark and by extension the European members of NATO in a difficult position, as it entails huge economic consequences, as decoupling (or even a meaningful de-risking) would take several years. Faroer and Greenland would also be affected, as a lot of their exports go to China and other Asian countries.
China has also started to seek more control over companies and individuals abroad to further its objectives. Especially corporate espionage and political influence are evermore present. Sometimes this even leads to direct political influence, as seen in Belgium.
The PRC wants to reshape global order in a similar way that Russia does. For smaller countries like Denmark, this is an essential threat, as force-based international relations is obviously not preferable for those in a weaker position. China uses every means in its repertoire to further its strategic objectives. Soft power, a growing military, growing influence in international institutions like the UN, the transfer of technology and knowledge, and a growing cultural influence as well as strategically informed economic decisions are all sides of the same coin.
What is not mentioned
The Intelligence Outlook 2024 does not engage in a discussion about possible conflicts and defense-related issues that find their origin inside of either the EU, NATO, or other related organizations. Whilst it is highly unlikely that any (western) partner will become a national threat to the Kingdom of Denmark, there are still possible developments that could at worst lead to a weakening of Denmark’s position. But even if these cases do not materialize, current developments in the US show a clear path for Europe and especially European members of NATO towards more responsibility. Whilst it is understandable to not seed distrust between allies, this is still a major concern – especially for small countries like the Kingdom of Denmark, as it would call for a massive increase in resources. The specific issues regarding hybrid warfare in the Baltic Sea are also not addressed directly, as well as the increasing threat of the Russian shadow fleet in itself.
Small countries like the Kingdom of Denmark often have to play inside the influence of the biger fish. That does not hinder them however from playing an active role in supporting their own interests, especially regarding national security.